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Militarism and the China Model: The Case of National Defense Education 
Christopher R. Hughes 
Abstract 
 
This paper proposes that advocates of the China Model deploy notions of culture 
and tradition in ways that hide the central role of militarism in Chinese politics. The 
hypothesis is explored by looking at the ways in which the country’s military and 
paramilitary institutions are used to propagate militaristic values and practices 
through the policies of National Defense Education (NDE) and National Defense 
Mobilization (NDM). This yields evidence from policy documents, the discussions of 
educationalists and the content of teaching materials. The conclusion is that focusing 
on the role of militarism provides better insights into the way that social stability and 
political continuity is maintained than resorting to vague notions of ‘culture’ and 
‘tradition’ in the China Model.  
 
Key Words: Chinese militarism, Chinese nationalism, National Defense Education, 
China Model. 
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The Concept of Militarism 
Militarism is a controversial concept due to its origins in nineteenth-century Europe, 
when it was used by liberals to discredit a certain type of politics that emerged in 
Prussia and reached an extreme point in the fascism of the 1930s.1 It is equally 
controversial when it is rendered into Chinese as ‘junguo zhuyi’ (军国主义) , a term 
that is associated with the military leaders who ruled large parts of China as 
independent fiefdoms after the failure of the 1911 Revolution. Yet there is another 
equivalent Chinese term for ‘militarism’ that does not carry such negative 
                                                 
1 Stargardt, Nicholas (1994), The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist 
Critics 1866-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 13. 
 2 
connotations. This the term ‘shangwu jingshen’ （尚武精神）, which literally means 
‘the spirit of appreciating the military’ and refers to a tradition going back to the 
Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 25 CE), when the Confucian Book of Odes was 
interpreted to mean that the Duke of Zhou was delighted by military affairs. 2 It  
existed in a positive and dynamic relationship with pursuit of the values of the literati 
civil service (wen 文) right down to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) when it was 
particularly important as an idea for the ruling Manchu military caste.3 In the present-
day, the term frequently appears in materials related to NDE and is widely advocated 
in popular writing.4 
This more neutral concept is similar in some respects to the way in which social 
scientists have begun to understand militarism in the broader sense of ‘the 
penetration of social relations in general by military relations’. 5 This widens the 
scope of analysis to explore how military values and institutions are used for political 
purposes beyond the tasks of the army as a fighting force, recognizing that ‘Most 
militarized people are civilians’ rather than members of the armed forces.6 As Alfred 
                                                 
2 It is normally traced back to a commentary by Zheng Jian （郑笺）, a scholar of the 
Western Han Dynasty on the poem ‘Drums and Bells’ (鼓钟), Book 6 Ode 4, of the 
Book of Odes (assumed to have been compiled by Confucius), which he interprets 
as meaning that the Duke of Zhou appreciates military ways.  
3 Pamela Kyle Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End 
of the Qing World, (Princeton University Press 1990); Peter C. Perdue, China 
Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Asia, (Cambridge Mass.: 
Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2005); Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Culture of War 
in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty, (London and New York: IB 
Tauris, 2006). 
4 See Christopher R. Hughes, ‘Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: the geopolitik 
turn’, Journal of Contemporary China, (2011), 20(71), p. 608. 
5 Martin Shaw, ‘Twenty-First Century Militarism: A Historical-Sociological 
Framework’, in Stavrianarkis and Selby, eds., Militarism and International Relations: 
Political Economy, Security, Theory, (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 
20.  
6 Cynthia Enloe, Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link, (Lanham, 
Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), Kindle Loc. 151. 
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Vagts, the first historian of militarism, explains, this makes the antithesis of militarism 
not pacifism, but civilianism.7  
Militarism thus understood can be found to varying degrees in all modern societies, 
including China.  The task for social scientific research is thus to explore how social 
relations are shaped through processes of militarization and de-militarization which 
are shaped by certain values. Herbert Spencer began to explore such values in the 
late nineteenth century, when he proposed that social dynamics are constrained to 
some degree by the existence of a ‘militant’ type of society. Within this, a high 
degree of regimentation is achieved by propagating values such as identifying 
goodness with bravery and strength, making revenge a sacred duty and cultivating a 
kind of patriotism that regards the triumph of one’s own society as the supreme end 
of action. It is thus essentially authoritarian, creating a situation in which ‘The habit of 
seeing everything officially controlled fosters the belief that official control is 
everywhere needed’. 8 Such a model does not disappear under modernization but 
continues to exist in varying degrees in a dynamic tension with an ‘industrial’ type 
that encourages the creativity and individualism required for industry to flourish.  
To understand how this broader understanding of militarism might inform the China 
Model discourse, it is useful to use concepts that have been developed from work on 
other societies that arrived late to industrialization. Studies of Germany between 
1870 and 1945, in particular, show how militarism can be used by the political elite to 
build coalitions with interest groups that are opposed to popular demands for political 
reforms.9 Especially useful is the idea that it can be used as an important theme in 
the construction of a ‘composite ideology’ that has to be broad enough to appeal to 
powerful interest groups with wide ranging demands.10 
                                                 
7 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (revised edition), (New 
York: Free Press [1937] 1959), p. 13. 
8 Hebert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (Vol. 2), (London and Oxford: Williams 
and Norton, 1902), p. 602. 
9 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire 1871-1918, (Oxford and New York: Berg 
[1973] 1997).  
10 Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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Such literature is also useful for understanding the implications of militarism for late-
industrializing societies that are of sufficient size to pose a threat to the international 
balance of power. The International Relations theorist, Jack Snyder, for example, 
explains how political elites attempt to strengthen their legitimacy by deploying 
‘strategic myths’ to build a composite ideology. Political actors in Germany and 
Japan thus felt no contradiction in portraying the United States and Britain as both 
existential threats and ‘paper tigers’. Such strategic myths can have a powerful 
impact on international relations if they force decision-makers to make irrational 
foreign-policy decisions, as with Germany’s aggression against Russia/the Soviet 
Union, Britain and the United States and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour.11 
Militarism and the China Model 
There are good reasons to propose that such concepts can provide insights into the 
China Model. First, the basic dimensions of the Model have much in common with 
the understanding of militarism as a set of values and practices that are designed to 
to prevent liberal political change. It is clearly authoritarian and opposed to the 
principles of liberal-democracy: in the economic sphere the state controls land and 
large-scale financial and industrial enterprises, while using market mechanisms to 
allocate labor, goods and capital; government is conducted by officials appointed on 
merit and led by an ‘advanced and altruistic’ elite, which is only checked and 
balanced by competition among bureaucracies; political legitimacy is derived from a 
popular belief in hierarchical values based on the family structure and opposed to 
individualism. Because these hierarchical values integrate the loose social fabric of 
districts and work units into the government system there is no need and no space 
for the emergence of a separate civil society sphere.12 
Second, as Kennedy points out in his critique of the Beijing Consensus, it is quite 
                                                 
11 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
12 Pan Wei, ‘当代中华体制：中国模式的经济，政治，社会解析’ (‘The Present-Day 
Chinese System: Explaining the China Model’s Economics, Politics and Society’), in 
Pan (ed.), 中国模式：解读人民共和国的 60年 (The China Model: Understanding 60 
Years of the PRC), Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2009, pp. 3-85. See also 
Zhao Suisheng’s discussion of Pan’s book in this issue of the Journal of 
Contemporary China.  
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normal for rapid economic growth to be accompanied by authoritarianism in East 
Asian societies, including Japan before World War Two and Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea in the post-War period.13 Although Kennedy does not talk 
specifically about militarism, such societies were formed through the construction of 
hierarchical and disciplinarian structures under long periods of martial law.  
 
Third, events such as the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic 
Games and the military parade held in Beijing on September 3, 2015, to 
commemorate the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Japan, make it clear that China’s 
political elite is prepared to invest significant resources in propagating values and 
themes associated with militarism. That much was made in the Chinese media of the 
fact that China’s arsenal of ballistic missiles contains weapons that can both destroy 
enemy aircraft carriers and hit targets across the United States indicates that this 
has important implications for foreign and security policy.  
 
Such evidence is circumstantial however. To further substantiate the hypothesis that 
militarism needs to be included in any account of China’s current politics, it is 
necessary to find evidence of a policy of propagating values and relationships that 
are clearly derived from military models. Such evidence should also show that this 
policy can be understood as part of a composite ideology that has political purposes 
beyond the fighting of wars. Moreover, it should show that this ideology includes 
‘strategic myths’ that form a link between domestic politics and foreign policy. The 
policy of National Defense Education (NDE) is a good source for such evidence. 
 
The Content of National Defense Education (NDE)  
 
The National Defense Education Law (NDEL) (国防教育法) was passed in April 2001 
and requires all citizens to undergo NDE from primary school onwards. It was drafted 
to codify an already existing set of policies in response to the call to ‘rule by law’ (依
                                                 
13 Scott Kennedy, ‘The Myth of the Beijing Consensus’, Journal of Contemporary 
China, 19(65), (2010), p. 475. 
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法治国) that was approved by the Fifteenth National Congress of the CCP in 1997. 
The process involved several years of conferences and debates among various 
layers of government, academic experts, and the military and continued with work on 
the curriculum guidelines after the law was passed.14 The contents and function of 
NDE were complemented and expanded with the passing of a National Defense 
Mobilization Law (NDML)（国防动员法）in February 2010.15 
 
The curriculum for NDE can be found in directives drawn up under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Education, and the General Staff Department and Political Affairs 
Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2001 and 2002.16 These clarify 
four objectives: the strengthening of consciousness of national defense; establishing 
the ‘spirit’ of national defense; acquiring knowledge; and learning skills.  
 
The NDE established a National Defense Mobilization Committee (NDMC) (国防动员
委员会) to draw up a fuller set of guidelines, issued as the Outline of National 
                                                 
14区政飈 (Ou Zhengbiao), ‘国家国防动员委员会综合办公室负责人就《中华人民共和
国国防动员法》答记者问’ (Member of the General Office for National Defense 
Mobilization Answers Questions from Reporters about the ‘PRC Law on National 
Defense Mobilization’), 2012. Online at 110 Falu Zixun Wang: 
http://www.110.com/ziliao/article-269146.html  (consulted November 11, 2015). 
15 ‘中华人民共和国国防动员法’ (‘National Defense Mobilization Law of the PRC’)，
State Council, 26 February 2010. Online:  http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-
02/26/content_1544415.htm (accessed 21 December 2015). 
16 State Council (2001), Document 48 ‘关于在普通高等学校和高级中学开展学生训练
工作意见’ (Views on Normal High Schools and Elite Middle School Initiation and 
Development of Student Military Training Work), Ministry of Education, General Staff 
Department Political Affairs Department (2001). Online at Zhengzhou University, 
Department of People’s Armed Forces 
http://www5.zzu.edu.cn/wzb/jsxl/8ac2809c3c13e297013c13fa00db0105.html 
(accessed November 11, 2015). 
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Defense Education for all Citizens, in December 2006.17  Chapter 7 establishes the 
following contents for NDE: 
 
• Theory: Evolution of Chinese military theory from Marxism-Leninism 
through to Hu Jintao; defense policy and military strategy; defense 
construction; defense struggle – especially the theory of information 
warfare. 
• Defense Knowledge: The national territory, adjacent seas and 
airspace; information warfare; high technology; defense economics; 
the armed forces; military leadership system; strength of national 
military power; the volunteer system and defense mobilization system.  
• Defense History: The country’s ancient, modern and contemporary 
military history, promoting patriotism, collectivism, and education in 
revolutionary heroism. Emphasis should be on the bloody struggles of 
the Chinese nation to achieve unification, independence and wealth 
and power; the role of the CCP in leading the whole people and the 
army in the revolution; stimulating patriotism by understanding the 
noble character and glorious deeds of revolutionary martyrs, national 
heroes and righteous individuals.  
• Defense Situation and Responsibilities: Understanding the international 
and domestic situations to oppose splittism and to protect national 
unity; clarifying the challenging security environment; clarifying the 
responsibility for national defense construction and struggle, 
strengthening a crisis mentality among the citizens (增强公民的忧患意
识). 
                                                 
17国防动员委员会 (National Defense Mobilisation Committee), ‘全民国防教育大纲‘ 
(‘Outline of National Defense Education for all Citizens’), 2006. Online at 
China.com.con: , http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/data/guofang/2008-
07/05/content_15959893.htm) (accessed November 11, 2015). 
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• National Defense Technology Capability: Military training for students 
and national defense exercises for the masses; defensive measures 
for air raids and nuclear war, battlefield rescue, use of light arms, and 
military techniques for the individual soldier and units; building morale 
and stamina. 
Local authorities adapt these measures to their particular requirements. An idea of 
what this means in practice can be gained from the Shanghai Municipal Regulations 
for NDE, set out in October 2007. These call on schools to build knowledge of the 
nation’s historical and present situation of national defense and to teach knowledge 
of military affairs. Specialist courses are supposed to teach technical subjects, such 
as defense theory, law, technology and economics. It is also integrated into the 
general curriculum and extra-curricular studies in kindergarten primary and junior 
middle schools by promoting the national flag, symbol and anthem, along with 
military flags, symbols and songs. It continues beyond formal education, with citizens 
being taught about national defense through a combination of ideological education, 
the law and the role of the military in establishing ‘socialist spiritual civilization’.18 
More information about the content of the curriculum can be gained from textbooks 
that have been approved for use in schools by the NDMC. These start with a manual 
for teaching military skills at primary and junior secondary school (starting age 6), 
which covers military drill, the use of light arms, basic combat skills, map reading and 
orienteering, and outdoor training. It contains illustrations showing the correct way to 
stand, march, kneel and salute. A chapter on the use of light firearms explains the 
different categories of weapons and ammunition, including a section on the 
construction and mechanics of the Model 81 Automatic Infantry Rifle (the PLA 
version of the Kalashnikov AK47).19 
                                                 
18 Shanghai City, ‘上海市国防教育条列’ (‘Shanghai Municipal Regulations for 
National Defense Education’), 2007. Online: 
http://zbb.sh.gov.cn/byfg/Pages/byfg001.aspx  (accessed November 11, 2015). 
19 国防教育编委会 (ed.) (‘Editorial Committee for National Defense Education’), 小
学，初中军事技能训练读本 (Reader for Drill in Military Skills for Primary and Junior 
School), Beijing: Educational Science Publishing House and Shenyang: Baishan 
chubanshe, 2008, pp. 21-28. 
 9 
A chapter on battlefield skills explains how to destroy tanks and infantry and defend 
a base. It also covers the importance of maintaining the right kind of attitude in battle 
and how to use terrain to one’s advantage, accompanied by illustrations of infantry in 
combat. Instructions are given on how to kill the enemy, as in this extract from the 
section on urban warfare: 
If you discover an enemy, use close range fire to destroy him. If the door is 
closed, force it open and fire into the room or throw grenades taking 
advantage of the shock to enter and eliminate the enemy. If the enemy tries to 
escape, use hand-to-hand combat or close range fire to eliminate it. 20 
Chapters on outdoor activities explain how pastimes such as camping are to be 
encouraged because they strengthen determination and harden the body and 
because they can be combined with military training. 
Further insights into the political implications of NDE can be gained from a 2008 
series of textbooks for the first three years of junior secondary school (for children 
aged 12-14).21 The topics covered by the chapters in each year are as follows: 
1: The contribution of the CCP’s paramount leaders to military thought, from Mao in 
Year 1 to Hu Jintao in year 3. This is followed by introductions to non-Chinese 
military thinkers.  
2: How the military system works, starting in year one with an explanation of the Anti-
Secession Law (passed in 2005 to codify the use of armed force against Taiwan). 
Subsequent years explain the system of military leadership, the structure of the 
armed forces and the role of military academies.  
3: National borders. 
4: Patriotic literature, including stories from the classics to illustrate the statecraft and 
stratagemes used in ancient China.  
                                                 
20 Ibid. p. 52. 
21国防教育编委会 (Editorial Committee for National Defense Education), 国防教育知
识普及读本 （初中一年级，二年级，三年级）(General Reader in National Defense 
Education Knowledge, (Junior Middle School Years 1, 2, 3)), Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue 
chubanshe, 2008. 
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5: A military song.  
6: Introduction of one Chinese and one foreign military figure.  
7: Combat skills. 
8: Defense technology.  
9: Stories of famous battles to illustrate the changeable conditions of combat.  
10: A story from military history.  
In order to understand how this curriculum is disseminated throughout society it is 
necessary to look at the institutional architecture that has been established for 
implementing NDE. 
The Institutions of NDE 
The NDE and NDML put in place a pyramid of institutions for policy development and 
implementation. At the top of this sits the NDMC, which reports to the State Council 
and the Central Military Commission (CMC). At its base are county-level defense 
mobilization commissions. The content of the curriculum is undertaken by a State 
Defense Education Commission, which works with the CMC. Local governments are 
supposed to take the initiative in adapting the guidelines produced by these higher 
organizations for use in their respective regions. All ‘relevant departments’ are 
expected to cooperate n ensuring that NDE duties are carried out smoothly. 
Enterprises, the media and cultural institutions such as museums, monuments and 
memorials are also expected to engage in NDE.  
Within the formal education system, all schools are required to include NDE across 
the curriculum, including in examinations. Extra-curricular activities are carried out 
jointly with organizations such as the Military Youth Schools and the Communist 
Youth League (CYL) at the junior and middle-school levels. Senior schools are 
required to work more directly with the armed forces to combine general classroom 
activities with military training and to establish dedicated courses. 
Beyond school education, all levels of government are also required to include NDE 
in their economic and social development plans and to educate their employees in 
national defense. The CYL, Women’s Federation and trade unions are also 
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commanded to play a part. Even private enterprises are expected to combine NDE 
with political education and cultural and sports activities when training personnel. 
Residents and village committees are also supposed to include NDE in activities for 
building ‘socialist spiritual civilisation’. Cultural organizations are expected to 
cooperate closely. Television, for example, is called on to broadcast special 
programs for NDE and on patriotic memorial days. Reduced prices and free tickets 
are provided when NDE activities take place at the tombs of martyrs, revolutionary 
sites and museums, science and culture galleries and theme parks. 
 
One of the most visible manifestations of this extra-curricular activity is the creation 
of a NDE Day, to take place on the third Saturday in September every year. This was 
selected because it fell close to the date when China was forced to sign a humiliating 
treaty with 11 foreign powers after the crushing of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901. The 
first NDE Day was held on September 15, 2001. Just four days after the 9/11 attacks 
on the United States and as China was about to join the WTO, around 1,000 
students from 29 universities and colleges in Beijing gathered in the ruins of the 
former Imperial Palace that had been destroyed by British and French troops in 
1860.  
The Role of Military and Paramilitary Institutions 
The PLA and its associated paramilitary organizations are also important institutions 
for designing and implementing NDE. As stated above, the PLA plays a leading role 
by being involved in the drafting of the NDEL and the guidelines for NDE. The 2002 
White Paper on China’s National Defense that more than 200,000 officers had 
already been involved at that time in extending NDE from higher education to 
schools, and that over 30 million students had received training since 1985.22  
This supports the view of those observers of China’s military who are skeptical about 
the assumption that its evolution as a more professionalized fighting force is the 
                                                 
22 White Paper on China’s National Defense, State Council, 2002, Online: 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/7336375.html) 
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same as the creation of a de-politicized ‘national’ army.23 China’s 2015 defense 
white paper leaves little doubt about this when it states that the ‘first priority’ of the 
PLA is ‘ideological and political building’. This is said to involve the tasks of carrying 
forward ‘core socialist values’ and working to cultivate ‘a new generation of 
revolutionary service personnel of noble soul, competence, courage, uprightness 
and virtue, and ensure that the armed forces will resolutely follow the commands of 
the CPC Central Committee and the CMC at all times and under all conditions…’24  
 
The way in which the PLA propagates militarism can be seen in a wide array of 
activities that support NDE. Media coverage of anti-piracy operations by the navy 
under UN auspices in the Gulf of Aden, for example, presents figures for citizens to 
emulate in the form of heroic images of marines posing in black combat fatigues and 
elaborate body armor, bristling with sophisticated firearms. The PLA also produces 
and sponsors cultural products, such as television dramas focusing on the Anti-
Japanese War, military toys and video games.25 
 
Developments in military doctrine also reinforce NDE by promoting the structural 
integration of the PLA into society, driven by an updated version of the Maoist 
doctrine of ‘people’s war’. As the purpose of this is to mobilize the population to fight 
modern wars under conditions of informatization it has a role in shaping the school 
curriculum and the career plans of university graduates in ways that encourage 
warrior activities.  Since the doctrine was updated to making preparations for 
‘maritime people’s war under modern conditions’ in 2006, it has become even more 
firmly embedded in themes that are central to nationalistic discourse, such as 
unification with Taiwan and asserting control over disputed maritime territories. 
Events like the Olympic opening ceremony and the September 2015 military parade 
                                                 
23 Specialists on the PLA remain skeptical about the degree to which 
professionalization leads to de-politicization. See, for example, David Shambaugh, 
Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press (2002), pp. 12-17. 
24 China’s Military Strategy, State Council, 2015. Online: 
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586713.htm 
(accessed 6 November 2015). 
25 Naftali, Orna, ‘Marketing War and the Military to Children and Youth in China: Little 
Red Soldiers in the Digital Age’, China Information, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 3025. 
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also symbolize the integration of the military and civil society, summed up by the 
slogan ‘Army and people unite as one person, see who under heaven can oppose’ (
军民团结如一人试看天下谁能敌).26 
 
The propagation of such values and practices is further supported by the work of the 
paramilitary organizations. The largest of these is the People’s Militia, which is 
currently being streamlined through a reduction from 10 to 8 million personnel. It is 
also the oldest, having originally been formed by local communities for protection in 
the absence of effective central government in the dynastic era. Appropriated and 
reconfigured by the CCP during the Civil War and the War Against Japan, after 1949 
it was given the task of providing support for combat operations and helping to 
maintain social order under the command of military organs. Its current reform 
involves an upgrading of weaponry and equipment to make it more efficient as its 
responsibilities move from rural areas to cities and along communication lines and in 
other key areas.27 
Like the PLA, the militia reinforces CCP legitimacy by pursuing goals linked to 
cleansing the nation of the shame inherited from the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1849-
1949). Given the current salience of disputes over maritime territories, the maritime 
militia play a specially significant role. Looking back with pride on the role they 
played in past armed conflicts, such as the confrontation with the South Vietnamese 
navy over the Paracel Islands in January 1974, they now coordinate with the China 
Maritime Surveillance force, which was established in 1998 with around 10,000 
personnel and 400 patrol vessels and its own fleet of aircraft. In 2013 this was 
merged with the maritime section of the Public Security Border Brigade, a 
paramilitary force under the Ministry of Public Security, and renamed the China 
Coast Guard. Its vessels appear frequently in the Chinese media at the forefront of 
attempts to assert control over maritime territories claimed by Japan and Southeast 
Asian states. All of these maritime paramilitary organizations now fall under the remit 
                                                 
26 Banners seen by the author in Shanghai in September and December 2015. 
27 ‘Structure and Organization of the Armed Forces’, Ministry of National Defense of 
the PRC. Online: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/reserved.htm (accessed 
November 11, 2015). 
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of the State Oceanic Administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources, which 
invests in propaganda projects such as the eight-part 2011 television documentary 
Ocean Bound (走向海洋), presenting a dramatic historical narrative of China as a 
great maritime power.28  
The other paramilitary organisation deployed for NDE is the People’s Armed Police 
(PAP). Created in 1983, it has come to play a particularly significant role in breaking 
down the barrier between the military and society because it is made up largely of 
soldiers who were demobilized as part of the downscaling of the PLA under the 
program of military modernization initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Overall, some 14 
divisions were re-allocated to the PAP, which now numbers around 660,000 
personnel. This practice of hiving off demobilized soldiers into paramilitary 
organizations and dispersing them throughout society may be repeated if the plan to 
reduce the size of the PLA by 300,000 personnel, announced by Xi Jinping at the 
September 2015 parade, is put into practice. 
The NDE system thus combines Party, State, military and paramilitary organizations 
into a pyramid of power. Directives concerning general content and principles are 
issued from the top and adapted to circumstances by local organizations, with the 
military and paramilitary organizations playing a role in implementation. An example 
of how this works in practice can be seen from the February 2011 decision by the 
Hunan NDE Committee to extend its activities beyond the general school curriculum 
into areas such as summer camps. This required the development of new teaching 
materials for use by schools, cadres and the militia, and the selection of a number of 
model NDE schools to act as pioneers. The provincial propaganda bureau called on 
the professional military personnel to lecture the militia on how to focus its efforts 
more on NDE and to emphasize the need to expand its presence in private 
enterprises.29  
                                                 
28 Also published in book form by CCTV-1, 走向海洋 (Ocean Bound), Beijing: haiyang 
chubanshe, 2012. 
29 ‘国防教育纳入小学初中教学计划’ (‘Bringing National Defense Education into the 
Teaching Plan for Early Junior School Learning’), 潇湘震报 (Xiaoxiang zhenbao), 17 
 
 15 
Militarism as an element of ‘composite ideology’ 
Having outlined the contents and organizational structure of NDE it is possible to 
explore in more detail the way in which it is used to cultivate militarism as part of the 
CCP’s broader composite ideology. Under Reform and Opening this rests to a large 
degree on successful economic development. Yet it also relies to an increasing 
degree on nationalism. This has especially been the case since the launching of the 
Patriotic Education Campaign in response to the domestic upheavals of 1989 and 
the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Chapter 7 of the 
NDEL explicitly stipulates that one of the tasks of NDE is to disseminate ‘patriotic 
spirit’ (爱国主义精神) as part of of the Patriotic Education Campaign.30  
This political function is elaborated on further when Chinese educationalists explain 
that the NDEL is a response to concerns that the patriotic consciousness of young 
people was being eroded by the spread of the ‘socialist market economy’. This, they 
maintain, was already becoming apparent in the 1980s, as memories faded of the 
threats from imperialism that had shaped the mentality of previous generations. It 
presented a more serious problem when the conflicts in Iraq and the Balkans and the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in the 1990s indicated that war was 
never far away and that hegemony and great power politics were continuing to 
grow.31 Such concerns go some way towards explaining why the NDEL was passed 
                                                                                                                                                       
February 2011. Online: (http://xxcb.rednet.cn/show.asp?id=1078649) 
30 Despite the salience of NDE, it is interesting that it has been a blind spot in studies 
of patriotic education. A particularly striking example is Wang Zheng’s excellent 
survey of the topic, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese 
Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. The cover of this book features 
school children saluting in front of a blackboard on which is written the slogan ‘Don’t 
Forget National Humiliation, Strengthen Our National Defense’ (勿忘国耻，强我国防) 
but NDE is not mentioned in the text. 
31 陈云金 吴忠国（Chen Yunjin and Wu Zhongguo），‘坚持创新，探素高等学校加强
国防教育的途经, (‘Uphold Innovation, Explore the New Route for Strengthening 
National Defense Education in High Schools’), in 廖文科（Liao Wenke） (ed.), 新的
理论视野－全国普高等学第三届国防教育学术研讨会文集 (Outlook on New Theory –
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just eight months before China fully embraced globalization by acceding to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  
 
Further contextual evidence for understanding the political function of militarism can 
be derived from the fact that the NDEL was also passed just two months before the 
CCP made the transition from a revolutionary party to a ruling party by expanding its 
membership to include a much broader range of interest groups. This shift was first 
announced by General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, on 1 July 2001, when he listed the 
‘advanced elements’ of socialism as including the founders and technical staff of 
non-publicly owned high technology enterprises, managerial and technical staff of 
foreign-invested enterprises, and the self-employed. Most sensitive was the opening 
of Party membership to private entrepreneurs.32 This new social order was ratified 
with the amendment of the CCP constitution at the 16th National Congress in 
November 2002 and can be seen as a countermeasure to the decline of the CCP’s 
organizational base under the ‘socialist market economy’.33 
 
NDE also plays a role in building the PRC’s composite ideology by confirming that 
the military remains subordinate to the leadership of the CCP. Mao’s principle that 
‘the Party controls the gun’ is thus established on the third page of the first year 
textbook for primary-middle schools. There is also an explanation of the 
constitutional structure under which all matters related to the military and national 
defense are coordinated and implemented by the CCP’s CMC, Central Committee, 
Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. There is even an explanation of the 
arrangement by which the CMC of the State Council is in fact the same as the CMC 
of the Party, because it is composed of the same personnel. It would be wrong to 
see this model of the relationship between the CCP and the PLA as a form of civilian 
leadership, therefore, because it is the principle of the unity of the people and the 
military (军民结合) according to Mao’s theory of ‘people’s war’ that is stressed.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Papers of the  Third Workshop on National Normal and High School National 
Defense Education): Beijing：Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006, pp. 7-8. 
32 人民日报 (People’s Daily), 2 July 2001. 
33 Hiroshi Sato and Keiya Seto, ‘The Changing Structure of Communist Party 
Membership in Urban China, 1988-2002’, Journal of Contemporary China, 17(57), 
November 2008, pp. 653-672. 
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These ideological functions mean that it is somewhat misleading when Chinese 
commentators present NDE as similar to laws passed by other states. The parallels 
they point to are between the NDML and the mobilization laws enacted in Germany, 
Britain and the United States in World War One, by France in 1921, the 1793 
General Mobilization Law of the Paris Commune or the national mobilization law 
promulgated by the Guomindang (GMD) regime in China during the War Against 
Japan.34 There is an important difference between such laws and the NDE and 
NDML, because they were introduced in the shadow of major war. The Chinese laws 
were introduced when China’s leaders had judged that a major war was not likely to 
break out.  
Comparison of the NDEL with the United States 1958 National Defense Education 
Act is equally misleading. The American law is limited to the funding of defense-
related science, technology and languages. It explicitly forbids the authorization of 
any department, agency, officer or employee of the United States government to 
exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of 
instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution or school 
system.35 This distinction is clearly lost on commentators who compare the US law 
to NDE at the same time as they advocate using the latter to prevent the growth of 
decadence and social tensions engendered by globalization and economic reform.36 
A more useful insight into the militaristic function of the Chinese laws can be gained 
from commentators who compare them to the laws of ancient Sparta. This is 
because they praise the Spartan system for being designed not only to familiarize 
the population with weapons and military ways of thinking, but also to further the 
ideological goal of propagating a ‘spirit of appreciating the military’ (尚武精神) in the 
                                                 
34 Baidu, ‘国防动员法’ （’National Defense Mobilization Law’): 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/3297642.htm; Gaogang 
http://www.gaogang.gov.cn/guofang/gfdy/gfdy/lgfdy.html） 
35 United States Congress, ‘National Defense Education Act’ (Public Law 85-864-
Sept 2,1958), p. 1582. Online: http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/57012400). 
36 Chen Yunjin and Wu Zhongguo, op. cit., p. 9. 
 18 
general population.37 As a combined delegation from the Second Artillery and Wuhan 
University to the 2005 National Conference on NDE in Higher Education explains, 
building such a spirit is vital to combat the spread of decadence, to prevent further 
erosion of the values of self sacrifice and to counter the tendency for leading cadres 
to forget how economic development should be related to building a ‘rich country and 
powerful army’ (富国强兵).38  
The analogy with Sparta and the call to propagate a ‘spirit of appreciating the 
military’ (尚武精神) in the cause of building a ‘rich and powerful country’ also draws 
attention to the fact that NDE has its roots in a program to use militarism to promote  
modernization that has its origins in China long before the establishment of the PRC. 
Present-day advocates of NDE themselves trace it to Chinese political activists who 
were active in Japan at the start of the twentieth century.39 Best-known is Liang 
Qichao (梁启超), who set out to construct a Chinese version of the bushido spirit.40 
Liang’s followers believed that the way to disseminate this spirit of ‘appreciating the 
                                                 
37 刘鹏 黄朝军（Liu Peng and Huang Chaojun）, ‘从国外国防教育发展趋势谈加强我
国国防教育的几点对策’（’Discussion of Some Points of Counter Policy for 
Strengthening Our Country’s National Defense Education from Developments and 
Trends in the National Defense Education of Foreign Countries’） in Liao Wenke 
(ed.), p. 49; See also宁春勇（Ning Chunyong)，‘论大学生尚武精神教育’ (‘On 
Appreciating the Military Spirit Education for University Students’)， 魅力中国， 
109:3，（2010），p. 59. 
38 张保国 （ Zhang Baoguo), 廖斯宏（Liao Sihong), 陈云金（Chen Yunjin), ‘新时期
我国国防教育面临的挑战及对策’（‘The Challenges Faced by Our Country’s National 
Defense Education in the New Situation’) in Liao Wenke (ed.), pp. 37-38. 
39 Ning Chunyong, op. cit., p. 59 
40 梁启超 (Liang Qichao), ‘中國之武士道序列’ (‘An Explication of China’s Bushido’), in 
吴 松（ Wu Song ), 卢云昆 (Lu Yunkun), 王文光 (Wang Wenguang), 段 炳 昌（Duan 
Bingchang) (eds.),  饮冰室文集 (Collected Café Works), Vol. 4, Kunming: Yunnan 
jiaoyu chubanshe: 2001, pp. 2151-21.  
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military’ was to emulate the policy of ‘military-citizen education’ (gunkokumin kyōiku 
军国民教育) that had been introduced in Japan after the Meiji Restoration.41  
This legacy can be seen in the project to build a ‘spirt of appreciating the military’ in 
NDE textbooks. Those for years 1 to 3 of primary-middle school, for example, 
present ‘patriotic poetry and literature’, while chapters on ‘The Storm of War’ contain 
stories of the tactics used to win battles in ancient China. Pictures of ancient Chinese 
warriors and war machines are presented as expressions of a ‘spirit of appreciating 
the military’ that stretches from the first dynasty to the present day. This is designed 
to inculcate an attitude in which:  
 
The spirit of loving the army and practicing weapons indicates the patriotic 
consciousness of admiration for military preparation, ardently loving 
armaments, concern about national defense, supporting the military and 
national defense construction, and protecting the dignity and security of the 
country’.42 
This militaristic tradition is said to continue unbroken down to the present, with even 
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek) acknowledged as the commander who led Chinese 
forces in tying down Japan's army. Ultimately the tradition is inherited by the CCP’s 
leaders, under whom NDE becomes an extension of ‘People’s War’ under high 
technology conditions. As a military training manual for middle-school students 
explains, former CCP General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, (who launched the Patriotic 
Education Campaign) was particularly enthusiastic about NDE as crucial for 
promoting a ‘patriotic spirit’, strengthening national (民族) solidarity and raising the 
                                                 
41 瞿立鶴（Qu Lihe）, ‘清末民初君国民教育思潮‘ (The Tide of Thinking About 
Military-Citizen Education in the late Qing and Early Republic), 师大学报 (Shida 
xuebao), No. 29, pp. 27-52. 
42新时期学校国防教育课题组（Editorial Team for New Period of School National 
Defense Education, 初中二年级国防教育, (National Defense Education for Year 2 
Early Middle School)，Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003, p. 53. 
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quality of the whole people (全民素质).43  
 
Strategic myths and foreign relations 
Further insights into the political function of militarism within the PRC’s composite 
ideology can be seen by looking at the way in which NDE is used to propagate a 
number of strategic myths about the international situation that are designed to 
stimulate a crisis mentality. This is most notable in a bellicose anti-Western tone, 
expressed when one writer on NDE for middle schools reminds his audience: 
War is not far away, we cannot but examine anew our security environment 
and examine anew our national defense environment. Although our security 
environment has had a big improvement of late, let us not mince words that 
some Western countries, when it comes to such domestic problems as human 
rights, nationalities, economics and Taiwan, have produced plenty of articles 
and engaged in containing our country, with the aim to ‘Westernize’ and 
‘divide’ it’.44 
This antipathy towards the West becomes increasingly salient in NDE teaching 
materials for use in the higher years of education.  A textbook for high schools in 
Hubei Province thus presents the US as a threat because it is seeking unipolarity, 
spreading democracy, imposing economic sanctions to open up markets, 
monopolizing high technology to exploit developing countries and spending 
massively on arms and forging alliances so that it can intervene in the domestic 
affairs of other states. The movement towards a peaceful, multipolar world is thus 
said to be an uncertain prospect, as other states come into conflict with a US that 
unilaterally intervenes around the world through a new kind of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. 
Globalization is thus portrayed as distorted by the sharpening of contradictions 
between hegemonic powers and between the North and the South, the deepening of 
                                                 
43 李明 (Li Ming)，中学生军训教育 (Military Training for Middle School Students), 
Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 2004, p. 4. See also articles 2 and 3 of the 
NDEL. 
44 Ibid., p. 6. 
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conflicts between nationalities, and the growth of problems of a global nature. The 
US is accused of making this situation worse by using the ‘War on Terror’ as an 
excuse to gain the cooperation of other big powers in maintaining its hegemony and 
build its presence in Central Asia and secure a geostrategic advantage in Eurasia 
and the Western Pacific.45 
Associated with the myth of an anti-Chinese West is the presentation of Taiwan as a 
threat. The chapter on 'military knowledge’ in the first-year volume of the 2008 
textbook for junior-middle school, for example, demonizes the island’s Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) and its leader, Chen Shui-bian, who then held the 
Presidency in Taibei. The GMD is again presented in a remarkably positive light, with 
former leaders Jiang Jieshi and Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) applauded for 
having never questioned that Taiwan is a part of China. This is in accordance with 
the rehabilitation of the party after its then chairman, Lien Chan (Lian Zhan), signed 
the landmark agreement on cooperation with CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao in 
2005. The Anti-Secession Law that was introduced that year to set out the conditions 
under which force will be used against Taiwan can thus be presented as evidence of 
China’s commitment to ‘peaceful unification’ and its peaceful rise to great power in 
accordance with Mao’s theory that the CCP’s use of force is always ‘just’ (正义) 
because it is always used to oppose ‘unjust’ (非正义) war.46 
These strategic myths are further constructed by defining the national territory in a 
way that challenges the territorial claims of many of China’s neighbors. The first-year 
textbook for junior-middle school thus describes the ‘yellow’ (continental) territory as 
including 120,000 square kilometers of India’s Arunachal Pradesh, south of the 
‘illegal’ McMahon line. It goes on to explain that continental China also faces threats 
from religious extremism, international terrorism and separatism, within which the 
                                                 
45  陈云金 沈友生 (Chen Yunjin and Shen Fasheng), 高校国防教育教程 （第二版）理
工大学出版社 (National Defense Education Curriculum for High School (Second 
Edition), Wuhan: Ligong daxue chubanshe, 2008. 
46国防教育编委会 (Editorial Committee for National Defense Education), 国防教育知
识普及读本 （初中一年级) (General Reader in National Defense Education 
Knowledge), (Junior Middle School Year 1). 
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‘separatist’ movement in Taiwan poses the greatest danger. This makes it essential 
to have a strong army, which has proved its mettle in the past through the ‘great 
victories’ in the Korean War, the 1962 conflict with India, and the 1969 clash with the 
Soviet Union. Again, this history is taken to show that China only uses force for just 
causes.  The 1979 invasion of Vietnam is accordingly explained as a response to the 
expulsion of ethnic Chinese from that country and as a way of helping other 
countries to resist invasion.47 
More pertinent for explaining the link between militarism and the heightening of 
tensions over China’s maritime territorial disputes is the description of the ‘blue 
territory’ that includes not only Taiwan but also the islands in the East and South 
China Seas that are claimed by China’s neighbors. The Chinese status of these is 
explained by a historical narrative that is consistent with the current emphasis on 
naval power that is being promoted in defense doctrine, the mass media and broader 
public discussion, according to which China was a great maritime nation until it was 
reduced to a weak, ‘semi-colonial’ and ‘semi-feudal’ society by feudal regimes that 
lacked an awareness of the importance of the sea and closed the country to the 
outside world. Only when ‘New China’ was established in 1949 was it realized that 
the sea is important for national survival and development, as shown by measures 
for the defense of the Paracel and Spratly Islands against Vietnam since the early 
1970s. 
China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over its 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and continental shelf is said to have been declared with the passing of the 
PRC’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous zones. A map showing the 
‘nine-dash’ line that claims the entire South China Sea appears in the textbook for 
second-year students.48 The first-year text book asserts that some 1,500,000 square 
kilometers of territory are illegally occupied because China ‘at present lacks the 
necessary means of administration’. This claim is strengthened by the geostrategic 
argument that the occupation of the blue territory by other states presents an 
                                                 
47Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
48 Editorial Team for New Period of School National Defense Education, 初中二年级
国防教育, (National Defense Education for Year 2 Early Middle School)，Beijing: 
Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003, p. 10. 
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obstacle to China's development because it is located on the sea-lanes linking China 
with West Asia and Africa and is rich in natural resources.  
The above strategic myths are finally brought together with the call for a strong 
military and the priority of economic development and national indignation as part of 
the project to shape national psychology. This is summed up by a paragraph in the 
conclusion of the chapter on the national territory, which states:  
For these reasons, the occupation and development of the beautiful and 
abundant maritime territory by other people is something that definitely cannot 
be tolerated by the Chinese nation. In order to protect our country's legal 
maritime rights, protect our country's maritime territory, we must not only 
increase our strength for maritime national defense, it is even more important 
and pressing that we strengthen the consciousness of maritime territory and 
maritime development of the whole people, strengthen our country's 
comprehensive power for maritime exploration and development to build the 
large and powerful maritime economy of the Chinese nation.49 
Analysis of NDE thus shows how the presentation of external threats and the 
construction of an expanded version of the national territory is typical of the way in 
which political elites in late-industrializing societies use strategic myths to mobilize 
the population by stimulating a sense of national crisis. This evidence should be 
taken into account by commentators who claim that China’s recent assertiveness is 
due to the constraints imposed on its leaders by a growing popular nationalism from 
below.50  
 
Militarism and the Making of Tradition in the China Model 
                                                 
49国防教育编委会 (Editorial Committee for National Defense Education), 国防教育知
识普及读本 （初中一年级) (General Reader in National Defense Education 
Knowledge, (Junior Middle School Year 1), p.28. 
50 Christensen, Thomas J (2011), ‘The Advantages of an Assertive China: 
Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, Vol 
90, No 2; Wang, Jisi ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Great Power Finds Its 
Way’, Foreign Affairs, 90/2 (Mar/Apr 2011) pp. 68-79. 
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Given that NDE is government policy and supported by the CCP and the PLA it 
should be a part of any account of the China Model. The case for this is even more 
compelling when commentators on the Model acknowledge the threat posed to 
social stability by tensions that are typical of late-industrializing societies. These 
include mass internal migration to the cities, fears among the elite over decadence 
through the commercialization of culture, and growing job insecurity in the general 
population as State Owned Enterprises are exposed to market competition. Such 
problems are becoming more intense as politics moves from the doctrine of class 
struggle to tensions between new interest groups that want to hold on to power and 
excluded groups that increasingly resort to mass protests.51  
Advocates of the China Model do not use the term ‘militarism’ (军国主军) when 
looking for a theory of stability in this situation. They do, however, resort to giving a 
central role to a hierarchical and authoritarian version of what they claim is a 
traditional social structure and consciousness. In a chapter on maintaining social 
order in Pan Wei’s book, for example, Fan Peng（樊鹏） states that it is traditional 
values that have allowed for a total form of political control that does not require a 
strong central power because it facilitates the integration of state officials into every 
part of China’s fragmented, family-based agricultural society. It is this tradition that 
allowed the CCP to control crime through a system of collective responsibility when it 
retreated to its base in Yan’an in the civil war. It then provided the model for the 
creation of public security committees in every town, village, enterprise and state 
organization when the PRC was established. With the addition of ideological 
mobilization through the Mass Line it was possible to reduce crime to a remarkably 
low level, using only three policemen for every 10,000 head of population.52 At 
present, however, this system is said to be coming under strain as emerging interest 
groups demand more centralized modes of policing to protect their growing wealth in 
an increasingly unequal society. ‘Rule by law’ has thus been accompanied by a 
deterioration of the relationship between police and citizens and a sharp rise in the 
                                                 
51 张静 (Zhang Jing)，‘利益组织化结构：非同质性内聚’ (‘The Structure of the 
Formation of Interest Groups: The Internal Consolidation of Different Qualities’), in 
Pan Wei (ed.), op. cit., p. 573. 
52Fan Peng, op. cit. pp. 455-495. 
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number of ‘collective incidents’ (群体性事件  
 
If tradition is to play such a central role in the China Model, however, it needs to be 
examined as an activity embedded in social practice, rather than the filling of a 
‘purely intellectualized “empty box”’ with cultural nationalist content (to borrow an 
expression from the work of Kiri Paramore).53 The ideological orthodoxy of Mao 
Zedong Thought, in particular, is heavily shaped by ‘a kind of military romanticism 
derived from the Chinese tradition upon Leninist doctrine and Leninist organizational 
techniques’, so that, ‘…military metaphors and military habits of thought permeate 
every aspect of Mao’s mentality and his approach to virtually all problems’.54 This 
militaristic tradition has played an important role in shaping the political institutions at 
the heart of the China Model. For Mao, it was not political power that grows out of 
the barrel of a gun, but ‘all things’, such as party organizations, cadres, schools, 
culture and mass movements. The army in Mao Zedong Thought is thus the ‘chief 
component of state power’ and revolutionary war is ‘omnipotent’.55  
 
This militarism reached a high point with communalization in the 1950s and during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), when the nation was called on to learn from the 
PLA. Under Reform and Opening, although Deng Xiaoping (himself a commissar 
and commander) downsized the PLA and reduced its role in politics, he quickly 
stifled calls for political reform by instituting the disciplinarian and authoritarian 
elements of Mao Zedong Thought in the form of the Four Cardinal Cardinal 
Principles.56 This set the context for the systematization of NDE to rise up the 
                                                 
53 Kiri Paramore ‘“Civil Religion” and Confucianism: Japan's Past, China's Present, 
and the Current Boom in Scholarship on Confucianism’, The Journal of Asian 
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54 Stuart Schram, ‘The Military Deviation of Mao Tse-tung’, Problems of Communism, 
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55 Mao Zedong, ‘Problems of War and Strategy’, Selected Works (Vol. 1). Online:  
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political agenda under Reform and Opening in the early 1980s, resulting in its 
codification as part of the Patriotic Education Campaign in the 1990s and early 
2000s. 
Looking at China’s present leadership, it has been noted by at least one 
commentator that Xi Jinping has been a particularly enthusiastic supporter of NDE 
since he assumed the directorship of the Provincial National Defense Mobilization 
Committee of Zhejiang Province, when he was Party Secretary there (2002-7), 
earning him the nickname of the ‘Military Hugging Secretary’ (擁军书记).57 He also 
has strong personal connections with the military, being the son of military 
commander and political commissar, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), and married to the 
celebrity military singer and President of the PLA Academy of Art, Peng Liyuan.  
 
It is no surprise, therefore, to see militaristic themes in the latest version of the 
CCP’s composite ideology, namely Xi’s project of the the ‘China Dream’, a part of 
which is the ‘Strong Army Dream’.58 The significance of the September 2015 military 
parade has already been noted above. Candidates sitting examinations for 
Ideological and Political Theory are also expected to answer questions on how Xi’s 
project for ‘the great revival of the Chinese race’ is linked to memorial days 
introduced under his leadership to commemorate victory in the War Against Japan, 
                                                                                                                                                       
nationalism see Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 
London and New York: Routledge,  p.13. 
57吳鳴 (Wu Ming), 習近平傳 (Xi Jinping Biography), Hong Kong: Wenhua yishu 
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the Nanjing Massacre and the sacrifices made by national martyrs.59 Moreover, the 
need for NDE (along with the call to further integrate the military and civilian 
economies), is restated in the section of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan that 
establishes measures for achieving balanced development.60 Even the anti-
corruption campaign is presented as the latest in a series of movements that go back 
to the CCP’s wartime base areas.61 In the realm of foreign affairs authoritative 
academics also present Xi’s signature ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) project as a 
mission to assert control over maritime territories and make China into a ‘great sea 
power’ (海洋强国) inspired by the thought of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the architect of 
American expansion at the turn of the twentieth century.62 
 
The future of Chinese militarism  
At present, militarism is not as salient in China as it was in the period of 
collectivization in the 1950s or the Cultural Revolution. Yet NDE shows that attempts 
are being made to deploy it in new ways due to the fears over social dislocation that 
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are also expressed by advocates of the China Model. Adopting concepts developed 
for analyzing processes of militarization in societies such as pre-1945 Germany and 
Japan does not mean that China will necessarily follow in their footsteps, however. 
This is because militaristic themes can be appropriated by a wide range of actors. As 
Oleg Benesch demonstrates in a ground-breaking analysis of the construction of the 
bushido tradition in Japan and its implications for China, these can range from 
fascists to internationalists.63 
As in other societies, the shape of militarism in China will be defined how such actors 
respond to internal and external shocks. A particularly serious problem for using NDE 
in such situations is how to make militarism interesting for a rising generation. School 
children are unlikely to be interested in topics such as discussions of the influence of 
Fichte, Kant and Hegel on the thought of Clausewitz that can be found in NDE 
textbooks. The same is true of the rising professional class, as illustrated by the story 
that appeared on Chinese social media of a young woman who emerged from an 
examination for a job in local government in January 2009, flummoxed and angered 
by questions about whether an AK47 is an automatic or semi-automatic rifle.  
Advocates of NDE are unlikely to give up their cause in the face of generation 
change, however. Contributors to the ‘Iron and Blood’ on-line forum, for example, 
were incredulous that someone applying to be a civil servant could be ignorant of 
something that even a junior school student should know.64  Yet Chinese 
commentators also recognize the need to make adaptations, such as reducing the 
role of the military and paramilitary in NDE to teaching military drill, leaving the rest 
of the curriculum in the hands of organizations concerned with tasks such as 
education and environmental protection.65 It is even being suggested that cellphones 
can be used to disseminate NDE.66  
                                                 
63 Oleg Benesch, Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism 
and Bushido in Modern Japan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
64 The discussion can be seen at Tiexue shequ, January 12, 2009, at: 
http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3968019_1.html. Accessed November 12, 2015. 
65 Chen Yunjin and Wu Zhongguo, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
66周晓彬 (Zhou Xiaobin), ‘以手机为平台加强高校国防教育的对策研究’ (‘Research on 
the Measures of Strengthening NDE with the Mobile Phone as the Platform’), Journal 
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In conclusion, if the China Model is entering a third stage, Chinese militarism is also 
entering a new phase.67 The outcome is supposed to be a version that is compatible 
with the broader post-socialist, composite ideology of the China Dream and 
inoculates young people against the transformative influences of globalization. Only 
by treating the construction of tradition in this project more critically than is done by 
advocates of the China Model, is it possible to unravel some of the paradoxes of a 
state that promotes militaristic themes, practices and strategic myths alongside 
notions of ‘peaceful rise’ and Confucianist harmony.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
of Heilongjiang College of Education, Vol. 34, No.7, July 2015, pp. 183-184. 
67 Following the periodization made by Suisheng Zhao in his article in this edition of 
the Journal of Contemporary China. 
